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ABSTRACT 
 
The paper examines how political institutions in comparison to legal, social and economic institutions fare 
with different measures of inequality in a cross section framework. The empirical analysis suggests that 
countries which practice democracy are less prone to unequal outcomes especially when it comes to wage 
inequality and income inequality whereas autocracy is associated with higher level of wage inequalities but 
its impact on income inequalities are insignificant. Though under good economic management, even 
autocracies may redistribute incomes from the richest to the poorest, more generally an autocratic set up 
violates the median voter hypothesis.  The results also show that political stability is more sensitive to 
inequalities than democracy and autocracy which is to say that the countries which are internally 
politically stable also form more equal societies.  
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1. Introduction: 
 
 
In an effort to achieve economic efficiency, most countries have dismantled their barriers 
to international trade in goods and services during the last couple of decades. As a result, 
the size of world trade in goods and services has dramatically increased. Few success 
stories have also emerged as an outcome of contemporary globalisation. China and India, 
have witnessed unprecedented rise in their growth rates as well as significant poverty 
alleviation. However for most countries, globalisation has come with mixed experiences. 
Most rich and middle income countries are experiencing rising economic inequality 
generated by skill biased technological change, international trade and other factors 
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related to globalisation (Smeeding, 2002).  Despite integration to the world economy, 
most countries of Latin America, Africa (i.e, Sub Saharan Africa) and some in Asia have 
failed to accomplish decent growth rates. In many countries in the South, poverty has 
increased. Even if some could grow at a decent rate, they have failed to put a downward 
pressure on the increasing trends in poverty levels. For example, Pakistan, which has 
recently witnessed a growth rate of 8 percent, has witnessed increase in poverty levels 
from 30 percent to 35 percent as of 2005.  Even in China and India, the falling poverty 
trends are not sustainable, as there is an evidence of rapid rising inequalities.  
 
Though the world after the very surge of colonialism transformed into a land of unequal 
opportunities, last century has witnessed a worse deal where global inequalities have 
partly lead to regional inequalities and then the come back of contemporary globalisation 
entailing post modernism had brought inequality to the very door step of each country 
where rural and urban divides have been ever increasing so much so that recently it has 
become of policy importance to consider inequality as a significant factor which may 
stifle growth promoting strategies and even reverse what good growth may bring to the 
society.  
 
In the retrospect, the problem of poverty can not be separated from the way in which 
growth is achieved. So, other than economic growth, what is the point of reference to 
economic development especially when it is about ensuring equity? Under global 
processes of production where trading societies learn and coordinate among each other 
to find common grounds for carrying out contemporary social norms which fits into 
international standards where business protects labour rights, promotes gender 
sensitivity, brings efficient social welfare system while following best commerce practices, 
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there are myriad of common institutions which simultaneously play a role in facilitating 
each country’s smooth exposure to global markets and international competition.  
 
 One of the most commonly quoted institutional factor for determining any country’s 
intellectual, social, economic and cultural progress is the so called notion of Democracy. 
Since all developed nations are well practiced democracies, this notion generally forms 
the popular opinion that democracy is the first step to any country’s progress. However 
to change the kaleidoscope a bit, one may also argue that it is their very own economic 
progress which has been able to sustain democracy in the West. Definitely it is well 
developed combination of social, legal, political and economic institutions which has 
worked in an intricate net of coordination to sustain Western economic progress and 
thus enabling the region to maintain its scientific niche. But where did the West really 
started it all? There are different answers for different times. For example, to go down in 
time line, say a 100 years, Western economic progress has been linked to colonialism 
which was an act of resource exploitation and dictatorial precedence in the garb of 
monarchies rather than following any course of democratic values. Today, Western 
economic models work under the prime of information accuracy and thus keep their 
edge over other regions based on their enhanced level of technology culture.  
 
 In developing countries, there has been evidence of rapid economic progress leading to 
democracy or moving towards democratically aligned economic models of governance.  
China, South Korea and Taiwan have been growing under one-party dictatorships, the 
last two eventually turning to democracy whereas China now seriously pushing for 
property rights to protect private ownership in the country. Recently, Pakistan has 
become one of the fastest growing economies of the region, even surpassing India, under 
General Musharraf and eventually moving towards democracy in early 2008 whereas all 
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political parties, who participated in February, 2008 General Elections in Pakistan, 
accepting the electoral verdict as free and fair - a rare precedence in the country.  Among 
the transition economies, rapid economic growth was achieved by Kazakhastan under 
Nazarbaev. Here one may conveniently assume that these countries while working under 
market friendly policies have successfully achieved robust economic performance which 
has then lead to stronger institutions. However the analogy is not that simple and mere 
good economics is not enough to sustain economic progress. Market friendly policies 
may not work in the absence of good institutions. The failure of Russian economy and 
its reform process can be attributed to the lack of a supportive legal, regulatory and 
political apparatus. In Latin America little attention has been paid to the mechanisms of 
social insurance and to the safety nets which has resulted in the dissatisfaction with 
market oriented reforms. India, in comparison to the countries mentioned above, is not 
only known as the largest democracy in the world due to the sheer size of its population 
but the country is also one of the fastest growing economies with a precedence of sound 
legal institutions. Due to robust legal institutions, the country is politically less volatile 
when compared to for example its neighbour Pakistan, even though both countries have 
in recent decades seen an emergence of multiparty governance setups. However, being 
developing countries as they are, much like Latin America, social institutions are 
underdeveloped which may mean that a well meaning democracy may still not exist in 
Indian case till economic progress reach out to the masses and benefits the impoverished 
peripheries.  It may also be the case that some institutions may be more important than 
others. For example, even pro-market dictators can secure property rights as a matter of 
policy choice (Glaeser, 2004a). Similarly, stronger social institutions lead to improved 
government functioning: “Education is needed for courts to operate and to empower 
citizens to engage with government institutions (Ibid, 2004: 3)” 
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Thus to analyse what makes it tick for good economics where not only economic growth 
is achieved but its economic dividends are also distributed equally among different strata 
of population especially in case of developing countries, a cross section analysis of 
developed and developing countries has been carried out in this paper where different 
institutional variables along with different proxies of openness/trade policy working as a 
control group are employed while focusing their impact on inequality.  
 
2. Institutions, Inequality and Endogeneity 
 
There are issues of two way causality between inequality and institutions (i.e., see Keefer 
and Knack, 2002; Chong and Gradstein, 2004), between different types of institutions. 
Many recent studies ( i.e., see Chen and Ravallion , 2003; Cockburn, 2001; Friedman, 
2000; Lofgren, 1999) show that international trade is significantly related with inequality 
while institutions and integration are also endogenous (i.e., Rodrik et al, 2004). Any 
empirical analysis which takes institutions as a pure exogenous factor while analysing its 
effects on inequality may lead to miss-specification bias. Here on the line of Ridrik et al 
(2004), we assume geography is a pure endogenous concept. 
 
Chong and Gradstein (2004) find strong evidence of bi-directional causality between 
institutions and inequality. Inequality may affect the quality of institutions. For example, 
high inequality will prevent the poor from investing in education or the ruling class may 
not invest in education so that the poor majority will not be politically active thus 
undermining the development of necessary social and political institutions. Easterly 
(2001) and Keefer and Knack (2002) suggests that social polarisation negatively affects 
institutional quality. For example, rising inequalities may lead to political instability and 
even civil unrest.  
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The countries with poor institutions are also likely to have high inequality. For example 
in Russia in the 1990s, a small group of entrepreneurs exploited their political power to 
promote their own interests, subverting the emergence of institutions committed to the 
protection of smaller share holders and businesses. In transition economies, weak 
performance of public institutions, infringement of property rights in favour of 
influential parties, lower willingness to use courts to resolve business disputes, lower level 
of tax compliance and higher levels of bribery all have been strongly correlated with 
inequality (Hellman and Kaufman, 2002). Similarly, in several Latin American countries, 
the ruling elites, the military and large businesses impeded smaller business interests 
giving rise to significant informal sector. Chong and Gradstein (2004) show that when 
the political bias in favour of the rich is large, income inequality and poor institutional 
quality may reinforce each other, indicating endogeniety between the two. 
 
There may also be inter-linkages between various institutions. For example, nearly all 
developed countries are democracies and most developing countries are either run under 
one party system, dictatorships or military regimes. The countries with lower levels of 
economic and human development tend to have lower levels of education, limited 
political rights, weak or non existent political competition, lower level of economic 
freedom and openness, ethno linguistic factionalism, the lack of judicial independence 
and a free press and high levels of permissiveness towards corruption.   
 
Before discussing the interdependence of different institutions we would first like to 
differentiate between them. We identify four types of institutions: 1) Legal, 2) Political, 3) 
Economic and 4) Social. Legal institutions capture the transparency and fairness of legal 
system, political rights of the citizens, State legitimacy, freedom of speech, independence 
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of judiciary, enforceability of contracts, police effectiveness, access to independent and 
impartial courts, confidence in judicial system in insuring property rights, prevention of 
improper practices in public sphere, control of corruption etc. Political institutions 
represent political stability, democracy, autocracy or dictatorship. Economic institutions 
include state effectiveness at collecting taxes or other forms of government revenue, 
states ability to create, deliver and maintain vital national infrastructure, states ability to 
respond effectively to domestic economic problems, independence of government 
economic policies from pressure from special interest groups, trade and foreign exchange 
system, competition policy, privatisation, banking reform and interest rate liberalisation, 
securities market and non bank financial institutions etc. Social Institutions capture socio 
economic conditions such as health, education and nutrition etc.  
 
The Legal, political, economic and social institutions are strong in developed countries 
and for developing countries there are mixed experiences. For example, intellectual 
property rights are protected vigorously in the US and most advanced societies, but not 
in many developing countries (Rodrik, 1999). Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) link the 
development of public education as a social institution to the democratization as a 
political process in US. According to them, while starting at about the similar level of 
development in the 18nth century, US led the way in setting up a system of common 
schools and promoting literacy, where as in countries in South America and the 
Caribbean these processes were much delayed. Gupta et al (1998) finds that if 
government officials use their authority for private gain and indulge in corruption that 
affects the effectiveness of social spending and the formation of human capital by 
perpetuating an unequal distribution of asset ownership and unequal access to education. 
Corruption also affects the government effectiveness as it weakens tax administration 
and can lead to tax evasion and improper tax evasion and improper tax exemptions. 
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Higher corruption is associated with increases in inequalities in education, land 
distribution and health spending. Wealthy urban elites can lobby the government to bias 
social expenditure toward higher education and tertiary health, which tend to benefit 
high income groups (Ibid, 1998).  
 
Furthermore, trade opening in societies with weak institutions may lead to worse 
economic policies (Segura-Cayuela, 2005). For example, those transition economies 
where trade reforms were implemented slowly and the government institutions were able 
to perform well with time, smaller increase in inequality and smaller output decline is 
occurred. However, the transition economies with weak government setups have 
performed as ‘passive globalizers’ and the trade-to-GDP ratios in them were quite high, 
partly accounting for capital flight, while poverty and inequality was increased (Yudaeva, 
2002).  
 
3. Data and Methodology:  
 
Much recently Kaufman et al (2002) formulated aggregate governance indicators for six 
dimensions of governance covering 175 countries.  They relied on 194 different 
measures of governance drawn from 17 different sources of subjective governance data 
constructed by 15 different sources including international organizations, political and 
business risk rating agencies, think tanks and non governmental organizations. The 
governance indicators have been oriented so that higher values correspond to better 
outcomes on a scale from -2.5 to 2.5. They are categorized as rule of law (Rl), political 
stability (Ps), regulatory quality (Rq), government effectiveness (Ge), voice and 
accountability (Va) and control of corruption (Ctc).  We divide them into four 
classification based on their definitions. We consider Rl, Va and Ctc as legal institutions. 
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Ge and Rq are dubbed as economic institutions whereas Ps is taken as a proxy for 
Political institutions. We add two more political indicators namely democracy (Demo) and 
autocracy (Auto) to our analysis from Polity dataset whereas, both ranging from 0 to 10. 
We have also included social institutions in our analysis. Average Schooling Years in the 
total population at 25 (Sch) and Adult literacy rate (Altr) capture the quality of social 
institutions.  
 
As we mention above, international trade is also a significant determinant of inequalities 
in countries across the globe, integration enters our regression model to enhance its 
explanatory power. We incorporate not 1 but 12 various concepts of openness and trade 
policy in our regression model in order to carry out a robustness check for our results on 
institutions.  
 
To capture inequality we not only take GINI income inequality index (Gini) from 
UNU/WIDER World Income Inequality Database (WIID) but also we employ UTIP-
UNIDO Theil measure (Theil) calculated by University of Texas Inequality Project 
(UTIP) which captures wage inequality between skilled and unskilled labour. This is 
motivated by several considerations. First, comparable and consistent measures of 
income inequality, whether on a household level or per head basis are difficult, almost 
implausible and generally fails to provide adequate or accurate longitudinal and cross-
country coverage. On the other hand, inequality of manufacturing pay, based on 
UNIDO Industrial Statistics provides indicators of inequality that are more stable, more 
reliable and more comparable across countries because UNIDO measures are based on a 
two or three digit code of International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) a single 
systematic accounting framework. Furthermore, manufacturing pay has been measured 
with reasonable accuracy as a matter of official routine in most countries around the 
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world for nearly forty years (Galbraith and Kum, 2002).   Further more we take income 
deciles and percentiles from UNU/WIDER World Income Inequality Database (WIID) 
as other proxies of inequality. Institutions or Integration will be guilty of inequality if it 
has the negative impact on the incomes of  bottom 10 percent (low10) and positive 
impact on the income of the top 10 percent (high 10). We also take income groups 
divided into quintiles where the effect of Institutions is anticipated to be negative for the 
ratio between top 20 percent and bottom 20 percent (high20/low20) and positive for the 
middle income groups (Middle20). The exercise on income deciles and percentiles will 
further shed light on how institutions and integration are related with income 
distribution. Especially, we are interested to know how quality of institutions is related 
with the incomes of the middle class or the ones living in bottom of income share. Each 
country observation for all inequality measures is taken for the latest year for which data 
is available and in most cases represent inequality in mid 1990s. 
 
Our basic inequality and income share equations would look like: 
 
Inequality = f (Institutions, Integration, Geography) …………......... (1) 
 
and    Income Share= f (Institutions, Integration, Geography)………(2) 
 
Corresponding to equation 1, our inequality model say based on Theil index has 1 
equation, whereas it corresponds to different institutional or integration classification. 
Then, the model specifications for Gini, High20/Low20, Midlle20, Low10 and High10 
contain same classification of endogenous variable combinations.  
 
iiii TradeITheil 11111 εχβα +++= ……………(3) 
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The variable iTheil is Theil Index in a country i, iI  respectively measures for legal, 
political, economic and social institutions, whereas iTrade measures general openness or 
trade policy in the economy and iε  is the random error term. Please refer to appendix 1 
for information on institutional and trade variables and their definitions. 
 
As we have discussed, there are potential endogenity problems between institutions and 
integration and between institutions and inequality itself. To this effect we have first 
regressed our institutional, trade policy and openness proxies on a set of instruments. 
Frankel and Romer (1999) suggests that we can instrument for openness by using 
trade/GDP shares constructed on the basis of a gravity equation for bilateral trade flows. 
Following Dollar and Kraay (2003) and Hall and Jones (1999), we use ‘fractions of the 
population speaking English (Engfrac) and Western European languages as the first 
language (Eurfrac)’ as an instrument for legal, economic and political institutions. Since 
we are using years of schooling and adult literacy rate as a proxy for social institutions we 
looked for instruments which can capture the qualitative and quantitative properties in 
education sector. Total public spending on education (as a percentage of GDP) and 
primary public-teacher ratio are the two instruments proposed by Mamoon and Murshed 
(2005). The former instrument captures the quality of education and the later instrument 
captures the quantity of education. As in Rodrik et al (2004), we employ ‘distance from 
the equator’ as another instrument (proxy for geography) also employed by Hall and 
Jones (1999). 
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4. Results:  
 
As mentioned above, we have utilised 3 proxies for political institutions namely, political 
stability, democracy and autocracy.  Political stability generally measures for conflict: (i) 
Military coup risk (ii) Major insurgency Rebellion (iii) Political terrorism (iv) Political 
Assassination (v) Civil War (vi) Major Urban Riot (vii) New government honors 
commitments of previous government (Kaufman et al, 2002). 
 
There is a rich literature which suggests inequality as a cause of conflict and civil 
violence. For example, Murshed and Gates (2003) find one of the causes of conflict in 
Nepal is persistent prevalent inequalities in the region: ‘It has also to be remembered that 
poverty, the lack of employment opportunities and other forms of horizontal inequality 
assist Maoist recruitment and retention, making life in Maoist cadres a relatively attractive 
options (p.10).’ Justino (2004) shows that redistributive policies have played an important 
role in the prevention and reduction of internal unrest in India and have been a central 
factor in preventing smaller scale conflicts from escalating into violent civil wars.   
Though many recent studies show that conflict and civil unrest is endogenous to 
prevalent inequalities, it may also be that these conflicts further deepen inequalities in the 
society.  
 
For example, the results of our institutional model for inequality (see table ן; appendix 1) 
indicates that political stability is one of the key factors to a more equal society and it is 
especially favourable to the wages of the unskilled population. Furthermore, politically 
stable societies not only redistribute incomes to the middle income groups but they also 
benefit the lowest segments of the society equally. However, in comparison to political 
stability index, democracy has a weak relationship with inequality.  The average effects of 
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democracy on inequality have generally been insignificant.  This is inline with the existing 
evidence which doesn’t find any robust relationship between democracy and inequality in 
a cross country regression. ‘Indeed a casual inspection of recent events in East Europe as 
well as in East Asia casts doubts that any such simple relationship may exist. It has been 
argued that, in the East European countries, democratization of the 90’s actually resulted 
in an increase income inequality. Similarly, some of the East Asian countries such as 
South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore have had among the most egalitarian income 
distributions in the world, yet their political record is far from democratic. (Gradstein et 
al, 2001: 1)’. According to Glaeser et al (2004b), it is good leadership that matters and not 
whether a country has democratic setup or ruled under a dictatorship. Nevertheless, our 
results do show that democracy seem to favour middle class more than anybody else 
confirming the median voter argument that democratised countries with greater 
inequality of factor income tend to redistribute more to the less affluent (Milanovic, 
2000).  Furthermore, Democracy appears to be better option than autocracy as any cases 
of significance as is shown in table  indicate that on average for the comity of nations, 
democracy is good for decreasing wage inequalities, where as autocracy seems to move in 
opposite direction.  
 
So what lessons can we draw from these results? Should it be that a country may 
compromise on democracy and follow a rather politically repressed system lead by a 
dictatorial rule? Both questions are very applicable to developing countries where most 
of the underperforming economies are lead by dictatorial setups whether it is Asia, Africa 
or Latin America. However as mentioned above there are salient exceptions too where it 
seems that the definition of Western democracy has not been fulfilled but an enlightened 
model of economic management has been adopted and success has been achieved as far 
as growth dividends are concerned. So how one may contrast such exceptions with the 
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ones where autocracy has lead to repressed market structures?  Is it all about market 
efficiency to defend autocratic structure if one may wish to? Our results put some light 
to these questions if equity and not only growth is the objective for a developing country 
policy apparatus. If some how less democratic political system may strengthen legal, 
social and economic institutions and promote political stability, it would not matter 
whether a western model of democracy be implemented by its word and spirit or some 
case specific combination of political and social methodologies are adopted.  Definitely 
democracy is not a sufficient condition in itself for contributing towards equity or even 
economic progress of a country. Rather democracy is just another part of the jigsaw 
puzzle which may only fit in properly at its right time when other institutional variables 
have evolved appropriately to support its conceptual application. Most democracies must 
have been autocracies or near autocracies when the political process in any country 
started out and this simply means mere concentration on democracy is futile to find 
solutions for institutional or macro economic progress. Rather democracy can be 
considered as a notion suggesting an objective and well developed end for the 
confirmation of economic, social, cultural and scientific development rather than a mean 
to an end.  However, in today’s rapidly transforming world where some developing 
countries may benefit from global markets more than others, they would find themselves 
under increasing pressure from their populations to transform into a more democratised 
system of governance once they witnessed higher level of economic and institutional 
development. In such scenarios, countries which may be doing good under well defined 
autocratic set ups may not only just have to decide to bring Western models of 
democracy to align their social development with global standards, but most importantly 
they have to decide about the timings of such critical transitions so that the economic 
progress they have achieved is well sustained as any abrupt changes may carry higher 
risks.  
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Table ש provides the results for different categories of institutions on the basis of 
significance count. The results suggest that wage inequality Theil is more sensitive to legal 
institutions than overall income distribution Gini. Results based on the ratio of income 
percentiles High20/Low20 and income deciles show that voice and accountability, rule of 
law and control for corruption all have a strong redistributive power. The relationship 
between legal institutions and income of the middle income groups Middle20 as well as 
low income groups especially for Rl and Ctc is positive and significant. This means that 
welfare effects of good quality legal institutions do not only reach out to the middle 
income groups but legal institutions are also altruistic to the poorest of the poor as the 
evidence suggests that redistribution of income takes place from the richest to the middle 
class or lower middle class as all the three proxies of legal institutions are negatively and 
significantly related with the incomes of the richest 10 percent or 20 percent in most of 
the cases. On the other hand, government effectiveness is also negatively and 
significantly related with wage inequality between skilled and unskilled. However, the 
relationship is weak at best with Gini. Though it doesn’t mean that effectiveness of 
government policies don’t carry redistributive effects. Our results show that if the 
governments which work in the interest of public; they have a significant and positive 
effect on the incomes of the poor and middle class, where as they are negatively and 
significantly related with the incomes of the rich.  Further more according to our results, 
if education is more equally distributed in a country or if levels of average schooling are 
higher, wage inequality would be less severe. Though Altr is weakly related with the 
income shares, results for Sch do imply that education has a strong redistributive power 
from richer segments of the society to the less affluent. A comparison of coefficients of 
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Middle20 and Low10 however implies that education benefits middle class more than the 
poor.  
 
5. Conclusions: 
This paper is an attempt to gauge the effects of different types political institutions on 
inequality and also to compare the relevance of political institutions in comparison to 
other national institutions ranging from legal, economic to social for forming more equal 
societies. Though the literature is limited on the subject, the existing one suggests that 
there are two way causalities between institutions and inequality. To this effect we solve 
the problem of endogeneity by utilising a set of instruments already in use for 
institutions. We used a rich set of openness and trade policy variables as controls in our 
multiple regression equations while also solving for specification bias which may present 
itself in studies which only deal with institutional setting in national setups without taking 
into account of globalisation which also play a prominent role in influencing institutional 
settings as well as inequality. 
 
Our results have reconfirmed that good quality institutions lead to decrease in inequality. 
It also appears that it is political stability that is more important than democracy. In line 
with previous studies, we find that it may not matter much whether a country is working 
under a democracy or autocracy, but it is good policies of the leaders which eventually 
determine the welfare enhancing effects through preservation of property rights etc. 
Good leadership which not only follow more market friendly policies but also keep 
institutional development at the fore of their policy choice is a key to economic 
development. Nevertheless, overall democracy follows median voter argument and 
autocracy violates it which makes democracy as a preferred choice for any governance 
methodology. 
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The paper also finds that political stability, rule of law, control for corruption and 
government effectiveness are the key institutions regarding inequality mitigation. If 
education is more equally distributed among the population, relative wages of skilled and 
unskilled labour will have least amount of distortions especially when the country opens 
up to international trade. Among economic institutions, regulation is less important 
when compared to government’s independent fiscal and monetary policy and its effective 
capacity to decentralise and its pro business orientation. Middle class comes out to be the 
main beneficiary of good quality institutions than any other income group.  
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APPENDIX I 
 
 
 
 
Table ן: Augmented Regression Coefficients for Political Institutions (Ps) 
Independent 
Variables 
 
                               Dependent Variables  
 Theil Gini High20/Low20 Middle20 Low10 High10 
Ps (Lcopen) -0.03 -4.68 -6.39 2.19 0.58 -6.87 
 (-1.57) (-0.64) (-3.57)* (5.49)* (3.11)* (-5.10)* 
Ps (Impnov85) -0.04 4.08 -6.72 2.17 0.54 -6.68 
 (-2.23)** (0.37) (-2.67)* (4.03)* (2.28)** (-3.69)* 
Ps (Impnov82) -0.03 -8.38 -6.31 2.09 0.54 -6.47 
 (-1.76)*** (-3.85)* (-2.72)* (4.20)* (2.41)* (-3.87)* 
Ps (Tarshov85) -0.04 5.87 -6.95 2.24 0.59 -6.91 
 (-2.41)** (0.52) (-2.69)* (3.99)* (2.38)** (-3.68)* 
Ps (Tarshov82) -0.04 -8.73 -6.54 2.17 0.57 -6.69 
 (-2.38)** (-3.81)* (-2.70)* (4.13)* (2.48)** (-3.81)* 
Ps (Open80s) -0.05 31.25 -13.32 3.21 1.25 -10.64 
 (-1.14) (1.06) (-1.95)*** (2.80)* (2.12)** (-2.70)* 
Ps (Tariffs) -0.002 -22.35 -13.51 4.32 2.69 -14.72 
 (-0.02) (-1.87)*** (-1.59) (2.01)** (1.61) (-1.95)*** 
Ps (Owti) -0.07 25.14 -7.36 2.84 1.09 -9.31 
 (-2.33)** (1.13) (-2.27)** (3.13)* (2.39)** (-2.94)* 
Ps (Txtrdg) -0.03 -14.12 -8.26 3.25 1.14 -11.23 
 (-0.29) (-3.37)* (-2.09)** (3.64)* (2.47)** (-3.54)* 
Ps (Totimpov) o.ooo3 17.57 -4.33 -0.03 -0.69 1.45 
 (0.01) (0.39) (-0.55) (-0.03) (-1.05) (0.33) 
Ps (Owqi) -0.09 15.14 -1.16 1.28 0.10 -3.40 
 (-1.10) (0.50) (-0.23) (1.05) (0.17) (-0.75) 
Ps (Ntarfov) -0.03 67.45 -14.16 1.98 0.42 -5.59 
 (-0.42) (1.33) (-1.19) (0.98) (0.44) (-0.82) 
-*, **, *** corresponds to 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. 
- Control variables are in parenthesis 
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Table : IV Augmented Regression Coefficients for Political Institutions (Demo and 
Auto) 
Independent 
Variables 
                    
                                         Dependent Variables  
 Theil Gini High20/Low20 Middle20 Low10 High10 
Demo (Lcopen) -0.004 -0.93 -0.649 0.23 -0.01 -0.63 
 (-1.25) (-0.63) (-1.66)*** (2.68)* (-0.25) (-2.15)** 
Demo (Impnov85) -0.005 0.53 -0.79 0.21 -0.01 -0.51 
 (-1.53) (0.24) (-1.65)*** (2.13)** (-0.02) (-1.56) 
Demo (Impnov82) -0.004 (-0.88) -0.915 0.27 0.02 -0.74 
 (-1.04) (-2.15)** (-1.99)** (2.93)* (0.36) (-2.41)** 
Demo (Tarshov85) -0.006 1.15 -0.79 0.19 -0.01 -0.45 
 (-1.77)*** (0.50) (-1.56) (1.90)** (-0.27) (-1.33) 
Demo (Tarshov82) -0.005 -0.91 -0.97 0.27 0.02 -0.73 
 (-1.50) (-2.10)** (-2.02)** (2.79)* (0.51) (-2.27)** 
Demo (Open80s) -0.007 3.51 -0.67 -0.02 -0.17 0.34 
 (-1.15) (0.69) (-0.67) (-0.11) (-1.32) (0.48) 
Demo (Tariffs) -0.01 2.08 0.43 -0.39 -0.24 1.58 
 (-1.81)*** (0.93) (0.33) (-0.81) (-1.10) (0.92) 
Demo (Owti) -0.007 5.84 0.13 -0.05 -0.13 0.41 
 (-1.99)** (1.11) (0.19) (-0.24) (-1.12) (0.53) 
Demo (Txtrdg) 0.023 -1.83 -1.16 0.52 0.06 -1.72 
 (1.14) (-1.74)*** (-1.13) (2.20)** (0.55) (-2.06)** 
Demo (Totimpov) 0.0009 -0.64 0.59 0.24 -0.19 0.97 
 (0.17) (-0.14) (0.74) (1.84)*** (-2.86)* (2.11)** 
Demo (Owqi) -0.01 3.04 0.40 -0.07 -0.13 0.458 
 (-1.47) (0.55) (0.06) (-0.17) (-0.72) (0.31) 
Demo (Ntarfov) -0.007 4.47 0.44 -0.19 -0.12 1.52 
 (-1.13) (0.94) (0.85) (-1.28) (-1.50) (-0.61) 
Auto (Lcopen) 0.006 1.20 0.70 -0.17 0.07 0.38 
 (1.24) (0.61) (1.11) (-1.49) (1.23) (0.98) 
Auto (Impnov85) 0.006 -0.19 0.92 -0.16 0.06 0.29 
 (1.35) (-0.06) (1.45) (-1.20) (0.96) (0.65) 
Auto (Impnov82) 0.0041 0.69 0.64 -0.26 0.03 0.63 
 (0.85) (1.17) (0.97) (-1.94)*** (0.49) (1.43) 
Auto (Tarshov85) 0.006 0.99 0.94 -0.12 0.07 0.17 
 (1.60) (-0.33) (1.43) (-0.92) (1.06) (0.37) 
Auto (Tarshov82) 0.005 0.63 -0.19 -0.23 0.02 0.55 
 (1.34) (1.06) (-0.18) (-1.74)*** (0.38) (1.22) 
Auto (Open80s) 0.004 -1.88 -0.47 0.26 0.27 -1.16 
 (0.75) (-0.39) (-0.38) (1.11) (2.02)** (-1.39) 
Auto (Tariffs) 0.01 -1.89 -0.71 0.361 0.21 -1.14 
 (2.39)** (-1.16) (-0.75) (1.00) (1.38) (-1.15) 
Auto (Owti) 0.008 -5.80 -0.55 0.23 0.22 -1.04 
 (2.04)** (-1.08) (-0.34) (0.77) (1.60) (-1.04) 
Auto (Txtrdg) -0.02 -0.70 -0.88 -0.04 0.25 -0.03 
 (-0.97) (-0.44) (-0.93) (-0.12) (1.28) (-0.03) 
Auto (Totimpov) 0.0002 1.04 -0.62 -0.31 0.23 -1.28 
 (0.04) (0.19) (-0.44) (-2.07)** (2.88)* (-2.34)** 
Auto (Owqi) 0.011 -2.96 -0.25 0.13 0.18 -0.68 
 (1.88)*** (-0.53) (-0.62) (0.26) (0.91) (-0.40) 
Auto (Ntarfov) 0.008 -5.68 -0.44 0.27 0.16 -1.11 
 (1.46) (-1.06) (-0.25) (1.59) (1.64) (-1.83)*** 
-*, **, *** corresponds to 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. 
- Control variables are in parentheses 
 22 
Table ש: Significance Count of Institutions  
Independent Variables                                 Dependent Variables 
 Theil Gini High20/Low20 Middle20 Low10 High10  Cases of 
Significance  by 
rows                  
Total cases of 
correct signs 
 
Legal Institutions 
        
Voice and Accountability (Va) 
    (Negative sign) 
5 out of 12 
(5 out of 5) 
3 out of 12 
(3 out of 3) 
5 out of 12 
(5 out of 5) 
7 out of 12 
(0 out of 7) 
2 out of 12 
(1 out of 2)* 
7 out of 12 
(7 out of 7) 
29 out of 72 
  
28 out of 29 
 
Rule of Law (Rl) 
    (Negative sign) 
5 out of 12 
(5 out of 5) 
4 out of 12 
(4 out of 4) 
9 out of 12 
(9 out of 9) 
10 out of 12 
(0 out of 10) 
9 out of 12 
(0 out of 9) 
10 out of 12 
(10 out of 10) 
47 out of 72 
  
47 out of 47 
 
Control of Corruption (Ctc) 
    (Negative sign) 
5 out of 12 
(5 out of 5) 
4 out of 12 
(4 out of 4) 
8 out of 12 
(8 out of 8) 
9 out of 12 
(0 out of 9) 
8 out of 12 
(0 out of 8) 
9 out of 12 
(9 out of 9) 
45 out of 72 45 out of 45 
 
Economic Institutions 
        
Government Effectiveness (Ge) 
    (Negative sign) 
5 out of 12 
(5 out of 5) 
3 out of 12 
(3 out of 3) 
8 out of 12 
(8 out of 8) 
9 out of 12 
(0 out of 9) 
8 out of 12 
(0 out of 8) 
8 out of 12 
(8 out of 8) 
41 out of 72 41 out of 41 
Regulatory Quality (Rq) 
    (Negative sign) 
3 out of 12 
(3 out of 3) 
2 out of 12 
(2 out of 2) 
2 out of 12 
(2 out of 2) 
6 out of 12 
(0 out of 6) 
1 out of 12 
(1 out of 1)* 
5 out of 12 
(5 out of 5) 
19 out of 72 18 out of 19 
 
Political Institutions 
        
Democracy (Dem) 
    (Negative sign) 
3 out of 12 
(3 out of 3) 
3 out of 12 
(3 out of 3) 
4 out of 12 
(4 out of 4) 
7 out of 12 
(0 out of 7) 
1 out of 12 
(1 out of 1)* 
5 out of 12 
(4 out of 5)* 
30 out of 72 28 out of 30 
Autocracy (Aut) 
    (Negative signs) 
3 out of 12 
(0 out of 12) 
0 out of 12 
(0 out of 0) 
0 out of 12 
(0 out of 0) 
3 out of 12 
(3 out of 3) 
2 out of 12 
(0 out of 2)* 
2 out of 12 
(2 out of 2) 
10 out of 72 8 out of 10 
Political Stability (Ps) 
    (Negative sign) 
5 out of 12 
(5 out of 5) 
4 out of 12 
(4 out of 4) 
8 out of 12 
(8 out of 8) 
9 out of 12 
(0 out of 9) 
8 out of 12 
(0 out of 12) 
9 out of 12 
(9 out of 9) 
53 out of 72 53 out of 53 
 
Social Institutions 
        
Average Schooling Years (Sch) 
    (Negative sign) 
9 out of 12 
(9 out of 9) 
6 out of 12 
(6 out of 6) 
6 out of 12 
(6 out of 6) 
7 out of 12 
(0 out of 7) 
5 out of 12 
(0 out of 5) 
6 out of 12 
(6 out of 6) 
39 out of 72 39 out of 39 
Adult Literacy Rate (Altr) 
    (Negative sign) 
8 out of 12 
(8 out of 8) 
2 out of 12 
(1 out of 2)* 
1 out of 12 
(1 out of 1) 
1 out of 12 
(1 out of 1) 
3 out of 12 
(1 out of 3)* 
1 out of 12 
(1 out of 1) 
16 out of 72 14 out of 16 
Cases of Significance (by columns) 51 out of 120 31 out of 120 51 out of 120 68 out of 120 47 out of 120 62 out of 120 - - 
- *  Observation made that a variable has entered the equation significantly but with a wrong sign 
- Significance is observed at 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
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 DATA AND SOURCES: 
 
Altr: Adult Literacy Rate, Year: 1999, Source: WDI (2002) 
 
Auto: Autocracy, Year: 1999, Source: Polity IV dataset  
 
Ctc: Control for Corruption, Year: 1997/98. Source: Kaufman et al (2002) 
 
Demo: Democracy, (numeric) Range = 0-10 (0 = low; 10 = high), Democracy Score: general 
openness of political institutions. The 11-point Democracy scale is constructed additively. 
Year: 1999, Source: Polity IV dataset 
 
Disteq: Distance from Equator of capital city measured as abs (Latitude)/90. Source: Rodrik, 
Subramanian & Trebbi (2002) 
 
Engfrac: Fraction of the population speaking English. Source: Rodrik, Subramanian & 
Trebbi (2002) 
 
Eurfrac: Fraction of the population speaking one of the major languages of Western Europe: 
English, French, German, Portuguese, or Spanish. Source: Rodrik, Subramanian & Trebbi 
(2002) 
 
Ge: Government Effectiveness,  Year: 1997/98. Source: Kaufman et al (2002) 
 
Gini: Coefficient in Percentage Points as calculated by WIDER. Year: 1995, Source: UNU/WIDER 
World Income Inequality Database (WIID) http://www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wiid.htm 
 
High10:  Highest Income Decile, Year: 1995, Source: UNU/WIDER World Income Inequality 
Database (WIID) http://www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wiid.htm 
High20: Fifth Income Percentile, Year: 1995, Source: UNU/WIDER World Income Inequality 
Database (WIID) http://www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wiid.htm  
 
Sch:  Average Schooling Years in the total population at 25,Year: 1999. Source: Barro R & J. W. Lee 
data set, http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/barro/data.html 
 
Impnov85: Import Penetration: overall, 1985.  Source: Rose (2002). 
 
Impnov82: Import Penetration: overall, 1982. Source: Rose (2002). 
 
Lcopen: Natural logarithm of openness. Openness is given by the ratio of (nomnal) imports plus 
exports to GDP (in nominal US dollars), Year: 1985. Source: Penn World Tables, Mark 6. 
 
Logfrankrom (FR) : Natural logarithm of predicted trade shares computed following Frankel and 
Romer (1999) from a bilateral trade equation with ‘pure geography’ variables. Source: Frankel and 
Romer (1999). 
 
Low 10:Lowest Income Decile, Year: 1995, Source: UNU/WIDER World Income Inequality Database 
(WIID) http://www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wiid.htm 
 
Low20: First Income Percentile, Year: 1995, Source: UNU/WIDER World Income Inequality Database 
(WIID) http://www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wiid.htm 
 
Nontarfov: Non- Taiff Barriers Coverage: Overall, 1987. Source: Rose (2002). 
 
Open80s: Sachs and Warners (1995) composite openness index. Source: Rose (2002). 
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Owqi: Non Trade Barriers Frequency on intermediate inputs, Capital goods, 1985. Source: Rose 
(2002). 
 
Owti:  Tariffs on Intermediate and Capital Goods, 1985. Source: Rose (2002) 
 
Ps: Political Stability, Year: 1997/98. Source: Kaufman et al (2002) 
 
Ptr: Pupil Teacher Ratio, Primary, Year: 1999, Source: WDI (2002) 
 
Rl: Rule of Law, Year: 1997/98. Source: Kaufman et al (2002) 
 
 
Rq : Regulatory Quality, Year: 1997/98. Source: Kaufman et al (2002) 
 
 
Tarshov85:  TARS Trade Penetration: overall, 1985. Source: Rose (2002). 
 
Tarshov82: TARS Trade Penetration: overall, 1982. Source:  Rose (2002). 
 
Tariffs: Import Duties as %age imports, Year:1985. Source: World Development Indicators (WDI), 
2002. 
 
Theil: UTIP-UNIDO Wage Inequality THEIL Measure - calculated based on UNIDO2001 by UTIP, 
Year: 1997. Source: University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP) http://utip.gov.utexas.edu. 
 
Tlex: Public Spending on Education, Total (as a percentage of GDP), Year: 1999, Source: WDI (2002) 
Thrd20: Third Income Percentile, Year: 1995, Source: UNU/WIDER World Income Inequality 
Database (WIID) http://www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wiid.htm 
 
Totimpov:  Weighted Average of Total Import Charges: overall, 1985. Source: Rose (2002) 
 
Txtrg: Trade taxes / trade, 1982. Source: rose (2002) 
 
Va: Voice and Accountability, Year: 1997/98. Source: Kaufman et al (2002) 
 
 
